This study was intended to determine the level of factors affecting the decision of 4th year BS Accountancy students from College of Maasin to work after graduation or to take the 2022 CPALE. In order to determine the factors affecting the decision of the graduating Accountancy students, the researchers adopted the descriptive survey design. Descriptive survey is a sort of descriptive study that uses surveys to collect data on a variety of issues. The goal of this information is to see (...) how different circumstances can be obtained among the respondents. The following results were derived in the course of the conduct of this study; There is bigger percentage of female than of male where 26 out of 27 belongs to the age group of 20 to 22. Majority of the student’s parent’s occupation status is working. Conversely, most of them only earns P2,000 to P5,000 per month even though the household member earning for a living is 1 to 4 members, the first 3 factors namely financial status, peer pressure and parent’s influence were found to slightly affect the decision of the student with regards to taking the CPALE or to work after graduation. The last factor, school’s teaching influence turned out that it somewhat affects the decision of the students, there is a significant difference between the teaching influence factor and the demographic profile of gender while on the age and parent’s occupation status, it has a significance difference with financial status factor. As BSA students taking a course where a licensure examination awaits after graduation, it is necessary to take some factors into consideration before coming up into a decision regarding taking the CPALE or to work after graduation. Based on the results of the study, the level of factors to affect the decision of the students was determined. It has been shown in the results that the three factors namely financial status, peer pressure and parent’s influence can slightly affect the student’s decision. However, among three, peer pressure has the highest weighted mean rating of 2.86. On the other hand, the school’s teaching influence has the lowest weighted mean rating of 2.29 which means it can somewhat affect the decision of the student. (shrink)

“Bodily autonomy” has received significant attention in bioethics, medical ethics, and medical law in terms of the general inviolability of a patient’s bodily sovereignty and the rights of patients to make choices (e.g., reproductive choices) that concern their own body. However, the role of the body in terms of how it can or does contribute to a patient’s capacity for, or exercises of their autonomy in clinical decision-making situations has not been explicitly addressed. The approach to autonomy in this paper (...) is aligned with traditional theories that conceive autonomy in terms of an individual’s capacities for, and exercises of rational reflection. However, at the same time, this paper extends these accounts by arguing that autonomy is, in part, embodied. Specifically, by drawing on phenomenological conceptions of the experience of autonomy, we argue that, in principle, the body is a necessary component of the capacity for autonomy. Secondly, through the presentation of two different cases, we highlight ways in which a patient’s body can contribute to the autonomy of treatment choices. Ultimately, we hope to encourage others to explore additional conditions under which a concept of embodied autonomy should be employed in medical decision making, how its underlying principles might be operationalised in clinical situations, and its consequences for approaches to patient autonomy in healthcare practice, policy, and law. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to present a novel reading of Kantian idealism. In want of a better name, I call my interpretation “one-object-plus-epistemic phenomenalism”. I partially endorse Allison’s celebrated position, namely his rejection of metaphysical world-dualism. Yet, I reject Allison’s deflationary two-aspect view. I argue that Kantian idealism is also metaphysically committed to an ontological noumenalism (one-object), namely the claim that the ultimate nature of reality is made up of unknown things in themselves (substantia noumena). Natural sciences can (...) only reveal the relational/structural properties of things as they appear rather than the intrinsic properties of substantia noumena in the negative sense. My anti-deflationary reading is similar to Allais’s, and my agnostic monism to Hanna’s. However, against both, I hold that appearances are not the accusative objects of our sensible representations, but rather, as Kant repeatedly states: “mere representations”. The accusative objects of our senses are substantia noumena in the negative sense. Moreover, my view is also similar to Langton’s. Again, against Langton, I hold that appearances are not merely relational properties of substantia noumena but the way that such substantia noumena exist inside our mind as “mere representations”. In this regard, I also partially endorse Guyer’s and Van Cleve’s phenomenalist reading because these substantia noumena in the negative sense can only be cognized mind-dependently, namely as appearances. However, against Guyer and Van Cleve, I hold that the phenomenalist side of Kantian idealism is purely epistemological rather than ontological: what Kant calls the necessary unity of representations according to categories is not a logical construction of objects out of representations, that is, an ontological reduction of noumena to appearances, but rather the way we sense-independently cognize mind-independent noumena. (shrink)

My account of the causal role of consciousness in a physical world is modeled on Dretske’s celebrated explanation of the causal role of beliefs (something that Dretske himself never offered). First, behavior must be understood as a (broadly individuated) process that begins with some external stimulus causing some neurological event C, and ends with causing a bodily movement M (e.g., the Kennedy assassination is a process that begins with Oswald pulling the trigger at 12:30pm CST on November 23 in 1963 (...) in Dallas, Texas, but only ends half an hour later when Kennedy is pronounced dead at 1 pm CST). The internal neurological event C causes bodily movement M, but only by virtue of being recruited by natural selection to represent the instantiation of some external property F when properly stimulated under normal circumstances. But the reason why C causes M lies in the fact that C represents the instantiation of the external property F. I withdraw my hand from a hot surface because the activation of nociceptive specific neurons in my parietal lobe (together with the activation of neuronal patterns in my motor cortices) was recruited by natural selection to represent the tissue damage in my hand. The activation of nociceptive specific neurons causes my hand to withdraw but for the reason that it represents tissue data at the time that I felt pain in my hand. (shrink)

This paper is a new defense of type-B materialism against Jackson’s knowledge argument (1982) inspired by the Kantian main opposition between concepts and sensible intuitions. Like all materialists of type B, I argue that on her release from her black-and-white room, Mary makes cognitive progress. However, contrary to the so-called phenomenal concept strategy (henceforth PCS), I do not think that such progress can be accounted for in terms of the acquisition of new concepts. I also reject Tye’s recent account of (...) Mary’s cognitive progress as the acquisition of a “thing-knowledge.” What is crucial is not the Russellian opposition between knowing things and knowing truths but rather the Kantian opposition between conceptual and nonconceptual representations of the same thing (property). Mary’s phenomenal knowledge is here accounted for as the result of the cooperation of her newly acquired nonconceptual representation of the same phenomenal redness (the same thing) she had a conceptual representation before. As that new nonconceptual representation carries information about the same physical property she already represented but is now coded in analog rather than in digital form (Dretske, 1981), that nonconceptual representation can be accounted for in physical terms as Chalmers’s Master argument requires. Nevertheless, that representation can account for Mary’s cognitive progress since it carries information coded in analog form, something that the imprisoned she could never possess. (shrink)

I aim to develop an alternative theoretical model for the direct cognition of the elementary states of others called the theory of interaction (henceforth TI), also known as the “second person” approach. The model I propose emerges from a critical reformulation of the displaced perception model proposed by FRED DRETSKE (1995) for the introspective knowledge of our own mental states. Moreover, against Dretske, I argue that no meta-representation (second-order representation of a first-order representation as a representation) is involved in the (...) process, but only concepts, rudimentary enough, of others’ emotions: contentment and discontentment. Strictly speaking, all the empirical data and findings in developmental psychology only support the hypothesis that children in the pre-linguistic phase understand perceptual facial expressions of contentment and discontentment. My proposal consists of the following thesis: The direct perception of others' elementary mental states is not a perception in the usual sense of the word according to which we just perceive things, but rather a “perception of facts.” But how to understand that? It is nothing more than an epistemological process that is automatic and reliable at the same time. It is reliable in the epistemological-externalist sense of not involving any inference, reflection, theorizing or epistemic justification: a baby’s perception of her mom’s facial expression of discontentment (in the usual sense of “per- ception”) does not constitute a reason supporting the belief that mommy is discontent. The very word “belief” should not be understood in the usual sense but rather in the sense of a natural inclination for truth. But at the same time, it is automatic because the belief is a result or output of a process entirely subliminal and computational in nature. Thus, for instance, a child perceives that her mom is discontent (fact-awareness) by perceiving consciously (“perception” in the usual sense) a facial expression of discontentment (sensorial input) but recognizes that her mother is discontent as a result (output) of an entirely subliminal process. (shrink)

Resumo: O projeto semântico de Davidson toma a forma de reducionismo que visa explicar as noções intencionais com base em noções puramente extensionais. O objetivo desse trabalho consiste na investigação do fracasso do projeto de Davidson como um argumento indireto contra sua suposição segundo a qual a chamada interpretação radical seria o fundamento do significado linguístico e do pensamento. Abstract: Davidson's semantic program is a form of semantic reductionism that aims to account for intensional notions on a purely extensional basis. (...) My aim in this paper is not to show that Davidsons fails in addressing the so-called extensionality problem. That is no novelty. Even Davidsonians recognize Davidson's failure. My main goal is to explore Davidson's failure as an indirect argument against his key assumption that the radical interpretation is the basis of sense and hence the possibility of thought. There is no priority of language over thought. This is a remnant of the so-called linguistic turn that Davidson inherited from the analytical tradition. The moral is the following: we must come back to Lockean common sense that to learn a natural language and to translate an alien tongue into our own is merely to learn a vehicle for communicating and expressing thoughts we have already had. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a new interpretation of Kant’s notion of consciousness of oneself as a Subject on behalf of a polemic with a recent reading suggested by Longuenesse. My central aim is to provide a systematic interpretation of Kant’s metaphysics of consciousness in general. I present and defend new interpretations for four capital Kant’s notions. First, I present a reading of Kant’s sensible intuition as a de re form of mental representation without conceptual content and any structure. It (...) makes the subject aware only in the limited sense of demonstratively representing what appears to him. In the sequence, I present a reading of empirical consciousness as the result of a first-order representation. The important introduction of §16 of the first Critique is construed here as expressing what is known today as the access consciousness. Lastly, I propose a new reading for the transcendental Apperception as an intransitive form of consciousness. (shrink)

From the second half of the last century, there has been a widespread view in the Anglophone world that Kant’s transcendental deduction (aka TD) aims to vindicate our common-sense view of the world as composed of public and objective particulars against some unqualified forms of skepticism. This widespread assumption has raised serious doubt not only about the success of TD but also about the very nature of its argument in both editions of the Critique. Yet, if there is a connection (...) between TD and global skepticism, the intriguing question is: Who is this skeptic? According to Strawson, “the skeptic” is a hypothesis of a purely sense-datum experience. In contrast, the fact that TD turns on the key notion of self-consciousness has induced several other scholars to assume that the skeptic is no none but a Cartesian external-world skeptic. None of those readings find textual support or are compatible with the very structure of the first Critique. The question is: Does this mean that TD aims only to undermine empiricism, as Guyer suggests? I do not believe so. I am pretty convinced that TD addresses a peculiar form of global skepticism, namely “Hume’s challenge to reason.” Assuming that we cognize (erkennen) and experience (erfahren) appearances as objects as a requirement of Newtonian physics, TD aims to provide a justification of the principle that nature is uniform that is superior to Hume’s justification. (shrink)

The claim that ―concepts serve as rules for the synthesis of representations‖ is understood by the mainstream of Kant‘s scholarship as if categories and concepts, in general, are conditions for the constitution of objects out of the manifold of sensations devoid of reference. That is the claim that I wish to question here. The claim comes in different flavors and formulations. Still, none of them are relevant here. I aim to provide an alternative account for the claim that ―the representation (...) makes the object possible.‖ I argue that the traditional view represents a solution to what I call the pseudo-problem of intentionality, namely to account for how a representation of something emerges out of a manifold of sensations devoid of reference. Yet, the intentionality problem is a misunderstanding of what I call the recognition thesis: the role of concepts is to provide the rules for the (mind-dependent) recognition (Erkenntnis) of the mind-independent existence of transcendental objects (noumena). ―The representation makes the object possible in the relevant sense that only by means of concepts can we recognize that what is sense-dependently represented actually exists mind-independently as transcendental objects or noumena in the negative sense. My view is embedded in the framework of what today is called ―Kantian Nonceptualism‖. Still, my view is neither a simple re-statement of Kantian Nonconceptualism nor depends on it. It is independently grounded on what Kant calls ―Erkenntnis‖. (shrink)

This paper aims to present a novel reading of Kantian idealism. In want of a better name, I call my interpretation “one-object-plus-epistemic phenomenalism.” I partially endorse Allison’s celebrated position, namely his rejection of metaphysical world-dualism. Yet, I reject Allison’s deflationary two-aspect view. I argue that Kantian idealism is also metaphysically committed to an ontological noumenalism (one-object), namely the claim that the ultimate nature of reality is made up of unknown things in themselves (substantia noumena). Natural sciences can only reveal the (...) relational/structural properties of things as they appear rather than the intrinsic properties of substantia noumena in the negative sense. My anti-deflationary reading is similar to Allais’s, and my agnostic monism to Hanna’s. However, against both, I hold that appearances are not the accusative objects of our sensible representations but rather, as Kant repeatedly states: “mere representations.” The accusative objects of our senses are substantia noumena in the negative sense. Moreover, my view is also similar to Langton’s. Again, against Langton, I hold that appearances are not merely relational properties of substantia noumena but the way that such substantia noumena exist inside our mind as “mere representations.” In this regard, I also partially endorse Guyer’s and Van Cleve’s phenomenalist reading because these substantia noumena in the negative sense can only be cognized mind-dependently, namely as appearances. However, against Guyer and Van Cleve, I hold that the phenomenalist side of Kantian idealism is purely epistemological rather than ontological: what Kant calls the necessary unity of representations according to categories is not a logical construction of objects out of representations, that is, an ontological reduction of noumena to appearances, but rather the way we sense-independently cognize mind-independent noumena. (shrink)

In this critical review of Robert Hanna's ingenious book (2006), I aim to support Hanna‟s main insightful reading of Kant, namely what he calls “a priori truth with a human face," without appealing to Kant's divide between a priori and a posteriori and analytic and synthetic truths. My suggestion is that transcendental propositions are necessary neither in the usual epistemological sense that analytic propositions are, let alone in the metaphysical sense that some empirical propositions are. Instead, they are necessary in (...) the theoretical domain in the weak alternative sense that they make possible the empirical recognition of appearances as an object as an indispensable condition of our self-consciousness experience, and they are a priori in the practical domain in the sense that their truth is vital for our self-comprehension as human beings. (shrink)

This essay analyzes two diverse interpretations of Christian love in the writings of Søren Kierkegaard and Josiah Royce. Through the comparison of these two positions, I attempt to show not only the embeddedness of a conception of love in an entire theological vision but its usefulness as a lens for examining that position. I argue that Kierkegaard's interpretation of love tends to foster social inequality, a tendency rooted in his basic ontology. The Roycean view of love, resting upon a radically (...) different ontology, avoids such problematic ethical implications. (shrink)

What are the freedom-relevant conditions necessary for someone to be a morally responsible person? I examine several key authors beginning with Harry Frankfurt that have contributed to this debate in recent years, and then look back to the writings or Søren Kierkegaard to provide a solution to the debate. In this project I investigate the claims of semi-compatibilism and argue that while its proponents have identified a fundamental question concerning free will and moral responsibility—namely, that the agential properties necessary for (...) moral responsibility ascriptions are found in scenarios where the agent acts on her own as opposed to her action resulting from freedom undermining external causes such as manipulation, phobias, etc.—they have failed to show that the freedom-relevant agential properties identified in those actual-sequence scenarios are compatible with causal determinism. My argument is that only a voluntarist-libertarian theory can adequately account for the kinds of cases that the semicompatibilist identify. I argue that there are three freedom-relevant conditions necessary for someone to be a morally responsible person: a hierarchical understanding of human desires [specifically and mental states generally], an incompatibilist (non-deterministic) understanding of human action, and a historical understanding of character development. The ability to reflect critically about one’s own desires and emotions, and thus to have a kind of self-knowledge and understanding with regard to the springs of one’s own actions, is required to make it possible for the agent to be the “source” of her own actions and character. The non-deterministic understanding of human action is needed for a similar reason: if determinism is true, then every action a person performs can be ultimately traced to and exhaustively explained in terms of factors outside the agent’s control, thus making the agent’s responsibility for his actions an illusion. And finally,human nature must be such that, over time, one’s choices leave a dispositional residue self-understanding and motivation in the person’s self, out of which, in mature understanding and motivation, the person acts as a fully responsible agent. (shrink)

Sa kabila ng napakaraming aklat na inilalathala taun-taon, sa iba't ibang disiplina, perspektiba, at pananaw, siya namang hindi lipos ang mga naililimbag, kung hindi man, naisusulat na mga akademikong rebyu ng mga aklat o panunuring-aklat. Mahalaga ang ginagampanang papel ng mga panunuring-aklat sa talastasang pantao at lalo na sa akademiya. Hindi lamang ito isang simpleng paglalahad sa nilalaman ng aklat, bagkus higit nitong kinapapalooban ang mga kritikal na pagpapasya, pagkilatis o pagsusuri, at pag-apuhap ng mga kaalaman mula sa binasang mga (...) akda patungo sa pagbubuo at kapakinabangan ng bayan o sariling talastasan. (shrink)

The following article aims to reconstruct the philosophical-political content of Primo Levi's 1976 essays "About Obscure Writing", focusing especially on the anthropological question of inequality.

Passages from the recently excavated Guodian manuscripts bear a surprising resemblance to a position ascribed to Gaozi and his followers in the Mengzi at 6A4-5, namely that righteousness is “external.” Although such a resemblance has been noted, the philosophical implications of it for the debate between Gaozi and Mengzi and, by extension, for Mengzian ethics have been largely unexplored. I argue that a Guodian-inspired reading of 6A4-5 is one that takes the debate to be about whether standing in certain family (...) relations makes a difference to whether one’s actions are righteous. Gaozi denies that it does, holding the view that one’s family relations, i.e., relations internal to the household, are irrelevant when it comes to matters of righteousness, while Mengzi disagrees, arguing that all relational properties, including family relations, are just as much reason-giving properties for performing righteous actions as they are in the case of performing benevolent actions. I argue that such a Guodian-based reading provides us a simple, yet explanatorily powerful reading of 6A4-5 that has broader implications for Mengzian ethics and our understanding of the early Chinese intellectual milieu in general. (shrink)

This essay calls attention to an aspect of Confucius's notion of ren that has often been overlooked or even denied in much recent discussion of the topic. While the egalitarian aspect of ren, i.e., the idea that every human being has the potential to become a ren person, is frequently asserted, the leadership dimension of ren has for the most part been given short shrift. I argue that for Confucius, ren is the leadership virtue. This conclusion is mainly based on (...) a careful and systematic analysis of what may be called ?the definitional ren passages? and some ?elucidative ren passages? in the Analects. (shrink)

It is quintessential to be acquainted with the complex cultural linkages between a nation and the globalized world— notably, the Philippines as a part of the Southeast Asian Region. The study centers on Filipino cuisine, academization, and its affinities. We may regard the concept of food and the act of partaking in it (i.e., eating) as mundane and ubiquitous in a way. Instead, we must view food and subsistence as a crucial part of cultural and historical inquiry. Some social scientists (...) and scholars dismiss the subject of food as a valuable source of tracing cultural and historical roots. Some people usually regard the recognition and intellectualization of food to Culinary Studies, but it is deemed limited. Truth be told, few to no literature sources reveres food and its role as significant in political, historical, and cultural discourse. This paper paves the way towards the intercultural relationship between the two regions, albeit clinging to unified cultural roots. Moreover, it may be interpreted as epistemological; nevertheless, it is essential to analyze food, subsistence, and diet through the lens of cultural history. The study can be defined the significance of Philippine cuisine in the Southeast Asian region’s macrocosmic space of food diversity. Consequently, the paper intends to present preliminary knowledge and investigation on the direct relationship between taste (aesthetics), food, and the expansion of the local concept of Kalutong Bayan. The researcher assumes that the contribution of his in-depth travels within the ten (10) countries across Southeast Asia (ASEAN) (2014-2018) led him to form potential linkages between what is being produced, served, and consumed may be considered vital in ascertaining historical roots of the Philippines and the entire region. (shrink)

Fra il 1892 e il 1896, lo scienziato francese Pierre Duhem pubblicò, nella «Revue des questions scientifiques», sette articoli che, per la prima volta, fecero conoscere la sua concezione della scienza a un pubblico più vasto. L’accoglienza reticente, persino ostile, che è stata loro riservata lo indurrà, già in questo breve lasso di tempo, a fare evolvere la sua concezione. Otto anni dopo sarà pubblicata la sua famosa «Théorie physique : son objet, sa structure», in cui sono integrati molti di (...) questi testi. Offrendo per la prima volta l’edizione bilingue completa di questi sette articoli, il volume fornisce una migliore comprensione non solo dell’evoluzione del pensiero duhemiano, ma anche del contenuto del capolavoro di fama mondiale che ne sarebbe derivato. * * * Entre 1892 et 1896, le savant français Pierre Duhem fait paraître, dans la «Revue des questions scientifiques», sept articles qui, pour la première fois, font connaître sa conception de la science à un plus large public. L’accueil réticent, voire hostile, qui leur est réservé l’amènera, déjà au sein de ce court laps de temps, à faire évoluer sa conception. Huit ans plus tard paraîtra sa célèbre «Théorie physique : son objet, sa structure» dans laquelle plusieurs de ces textes se trouvent intégrés. En offrant pour la première fois l’édition bilingue intégrale de ces sept articles, ce volume permet donc de mieux comprendre non seulement l’évolution de la pensée duhémienne, mais encore le contenu du maître-ouvrage, mondialement connu, qui devait en résulter. (shrink)

Nhật Bản thường được biết đến là một cường quốc khoa học không chỉ ở Châu Á mà trên toàn thế giới với rất nhiều giải thưởng khoa học cao quý và sản lượng khoa học ổn định ở mức cao nhiều thập niên qua. Tuy nhiên, trong khoảng 10 năm trở lại đây, thế giới đã thường xuyên ghi nhận những vụ bê bối về đạo đức nghiên cứu tại Nhật Bản. Xem xét kĩ lưỡng nội dung chi tiết (...) các vụ bê bối có thể thấy Nhật Bản đang gặp phải những thách thức nan giải trong việc ngăn chặn và kiểm soát vi phạm đạo đức nghiên cứu. Một phần quan trọng của thách thức này là sự xung đột giữa một bên là những yếu tố có tính lịch sử và văn hóa, và bên kia là sự phát triển của công nghệ thông tin và xu hướng hợp tác quốc tế mở rộng. Nghiên cứu trường hợp của Nhật Bản có thể mang lại những bài học quan trọng trong việc xây dựng khả năng đào tạo và quản lí đạo đức nghiên cứu tại một nền khoa học mới hội nhập như Việt Nam. (shrink)

Neste artigo é apresentada uma interpretação dos critérios propostos por Aristóteles para separar as ações voluntárias das demais ações, assim como do tratamento aristotélico das ações mistas, das não-voluntárias e das reações morais que lhes são devidas. A interpretação defendida se concentra na Ética Nicomaquéia (EN) e faz uso da Ética Eudêmia (EE) apenas ocasionalmente. Só podemos afirmar que agimos de forma involuntária ou não-voluntária quando somos constrangidos a sofrer uma determinada ação ou quando realizamos algo por acidente.

The problem of other minds has a distinguished philosophical history stretching back more than two hundred years. Taken at face value, it is an epistemological question: it concerns how we can have knowledge of, or at least justified belief in, the existence of minds other than our own. In recent decades, philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, anthropologists and primatologists have debated a related question: how we actually go about attributing mental states to others (regardless of whether we ever achieve knowledge or rational (...) justification in this domain). Until the mid-nineties, the latter debate – which sometimes goes under the name of the “mindreading” debate – was characterized by a fairly clear-cut opposition between two theoretical outlooks: “theory-theory” (TT) and “simulation theory” (ST). Theory-theorists typically argued that we attribute mental states to others on the basis of a “theory of mind” that is either constructed in early infancy and subsequently revised and modified (Gopnik 1996), or else is the result of maturation of innate mindreading “modules” (Baron-Cohen 1995). (shrink)

It was the emphasis of Søren Kierkegaard's railing against 19th-century Danish Christianity in all its ruthlessness that eventually led him to utterly reject and actively fight the majority of the contemporary as well as important aspects of the historical discourse on Christianity. One of the aspects that Kierkegaard distanced himself from sharply consists in the long tradition of Christian mysticism. Nevertheless his concept of the “knight of faith” reveals several deliberations that appear to be close to mystical Christian conceptions (e.g. (...) the meaning of suffering or despair for the leap of faith, an increasing awareness of sin and guilt as well as the conditions for the knight of faith's secular ministry). Thus, Kierkegaard's critique of mysticism suggests his misunderstanding of the mystical perspective's implications. This essay tries to solve said misunderstanding between Kierkegaard and christian tradition by interrelating the process of becoming a knight of faith with the mystical responsibility before the divine and the ethical responsibility before all of humanity. (shrink)

The article intends to present untold narratives from Filipino overseas migrant workers that the author personally encountered and interviewed. Literature that primarily focuses on their quotidian lives is rarely discussed and written. The author used travel memoir as a primary method to describe his journey reflections while not neglecting academic inquiry relying on existing works of literature (secondary sources) to validate his observations. The author gathered significant pathways from his travels to engage in a historical search on the distinct and (...) diversified cultures formed and transformed by Filipino overseas migrant workers. -/- The scope and limitations of this paper are centered on Filipinos dwelling in particular countries in the Southeast Asian region as follows: Malaysia (2014), Singapore (2014), Cambodia (2017), Brunei Darussalam (2016), and Europe - solely focused on Spain (2018). This paper intends to contribute to the flourishing discipline of Diaspora Studies. Furthermore, it strives to offer significant literature on a particular sectoral field, Women's Studies. The paper also produced testimonial narratives that describe the intersectionality of Filipino women as migrant workers, except for the case of workers in Brunei Darussalam. -/- The author has ascertained a multitude of insights, realizations, and overlying themes. For instance, Filipino overseas migrant workers in Malaysia experienced common themes of violence and struggles; determining Filipino spaces in Singapore; establishing Filipino identity and culture in Cambodia; realized opportunities and challenges from the phenomenon of transnationalism of some migrant workers in Spain; and coping mechanisms of some male migrant workers in Brunei. On the one hand, such writings may not be considered groundbreaking work on the creation of academic narratives. On the other hand, the author contends such themes of opportunities, struggles, and sacrifices of Filipino migrant workers narratives are diachronic - continuous through time. (shrink)

Bilang “kathang-buhay” ni Zeus A. Salazar, ang tinaguriang Ama ng Pantayong Pananaw (PP) at ng Bagong Historiograpiyang Pilipino, hindi mauunawaan ang PP nang hiwalay sa kanyang akademikong talambuhay. Kaya naman mainam na baybayin angkasaysayan ng Pantayong Pananaw sa konteksto ng kapantasanni Salazar. Maaaring hatiin ang kasaysayan ng PP sa konteksto ng kapantasan ni Salazar sa limang yugto, gamit ang metapora ng paglago ng halaman: 1. Panahon ng Pagpupunla ng mga ideyang magiging batayang kaisipan ng PP sa hinaharap, mula sapagpasok ni (...) Salazar sa Unibersidad ng Pilipinas (PP) bilang magaaral ng kasaysayan (1951) hanggang sa pagkakalimbag ngkanyang Ang Pagtuturo ng Kasaysayan sa Pilipino (1970), maaari itong bansagan bilang “Yugtong Pre-Pantayo”; 2. Panahon ng Pag-uugat ng PP sa UP mula sa pagkakalimbag ng artikulo ukol sa wikang Filipino (1970) hanggang sa pagdaraos ng Unang Pambansang Kumperensya sa Historiograpiyang Pilipino, kaalinsabay ng paghirang sa kanya bilang dekano ng Dalubhasaan ng Agham Panlipunan at Pilosopiya at pagdaraos ng (1989), 3. Panahon ng Pagsibol ng PP sa UP na tumutukoy sa institusyunalisasyon nito sa UP Departamento ng Kasaysayanmula sa kumperensyang ito (1989) hanggang sa pagkakalimbag ng Pantayong Pananaw: Ugat at Kabuluhan (1997), 4. Panahon ng Pagyabong ng PP sa labas ng UP mula sa pagkakalimbag ng aklat (1997) hanggang sa paglulunsad ng Saliksik E-Journal (2012), at 5. Panahon ng Pamumunga mula sa paglulunsad ngSaliksik E-Journal (2012) hanggang sa pagtatapos ng pagtuturo ni Salazar sa Politeknikong Unibersidad ng Pilipinas (2019). (shrink)

O presente trabalho visa demonstrar como a relação entre corpo e alma são indispensáveis para o viver. Para tanto, considera a tese de que o ser animado é uma substância composta de matéria e forma, que também pode ser analisada sob a perspectiva de potência e ato. Neste sentido, o trabalho inicia com a compreensão sobre o que é uma substância, qual tipo de substância é o ser vivo para, em seguida, mediante as definições de alma presentes no livro Β (...) do De Anima, perceber como se dá a relação entre corpo e alma e porque tal relação é necessária ao viver. (shrink)

Dalawa sa mga hibla ng Pilosopiyang Filipino ay patungkol sa paggamit ng banyagang pilosopiya at pamimilosopiya sa wikang Filipino. Makatutulong ang dalawang ito tungo sa pagsasalin ng mga banyagang kaisipan sa talastasang bayan. Ang dalawang hiblang ito ang nais na ambagan ng kasalukuyang sanaysay, sa pamamagitan ng pagsasagawa ng rebyu sa isang halimbawa ng anime/manga na Hapon: ang Attack on Titan (AOT) ni Hajime Isayama. Gagamitin sa pagbasa ng AOT ang mga pilosopikal na pananaw ng ilang Aleman/Austrianong pilosoper/sikolohista na sina (...) Sigmund Freud, Erich Fromm, Carl Schmitt, at Friedrich Nietzsche. Sa pagbasang ito sa pamamagitan ng apat na banyagang palaisip, tututukan ang tema ng kalayaan at digmaan. Liban dito, maglalatag din ng pagmumuni-muni ukol sa paksa ng pananangkapan sa kasaysayan bilang sandatang pulitikal, isang temang lantad na lantad rin sa AOT. Ang lahat ng ito ay isasagawa sa wikang Filipino, bilang pagtatangka na makapag-ambag sa pagpapasok ng anime/manga na Hapon at pilosopiyang Aleman/Austriano sa talastasang bayan. (shrink)

Com o propósito de analisar a relação entre ser e movimento a partir dos conceitos de ato e potência, elaboramos um mapeamento do livro Θ da Metafísica, capaz de orientar o entendimento de sua estrutura central. Visto como um dos modos de se dizer o ser, o ser em ato e em potência é parte integrante e fundamental da investigação metafísica. A distinção entre ser em ato e em potência pretende resolver o clássico problema do não-ser que vem a ser, (...) mostrando como o não-ser é apenas não-ser ainda em ato, mas já é ser em potência e este guarda as condições para sua necessária atualização. A reconstrução argumentativa de Θ procurou ressaltar três aspectos principais: (1) Ato e potência funcionam como um elemento de conexão entre as outras ciências – práticas, produtivas e teóricas – que são subordinadas à Ciência do Ser enquanto Ser, a Metafísica. (2) Há uma forte relação entre o par conceitual ato/potência e os outros conceitos fundamentais da filosofia aristotélica, tais como: substância, forma, matéria, ação, bem, natureza e fim. Desse modo, ato e potência somente serão plenamente compreendidos se também forem considerados esses outros conceitos. (3) Há uma relação direta entre os dois sentidos em que ato e potência podem ser entendidos - o cinético e o metafísico - e a seguinte divisão interna de Θ: de Θ1 a Θ5 a investigação está centrada sob o ângulo do movimento, é o momento cinético, em que Aristóteles dedica-se mais à análise da potência caracterizada como um princípio de movimento. (shrink)

Célèbre fourmi-homme E.O. Wilson a toujours été l’un de mes héros - non seulement un biologiste exceptionnel, mais l’une des minorités minuscules et en voie de disparition des intellectuels qui ose au moins faire allusion à la vérité sur notre nature que d’autres ne parviennent pas à saisir, ou dans la mesure osant o saisir, soigneusement éviter pour l’opportunisme politique. Malheureusement, il met fin à sa longue carrière d’une manière très sordide en tant que parti à une attaque ignorante et (...) arrogante sur la science motivée au moins en partie par la ferveur religieuse de ses collègues de Harvard. Il montre les conséquences ignobles lorsque les universités acceptent l’argent de groupes religieux, les revues scientifiques sont tellement impressionnés par les grands noms qu’ils évitent l’examen par les pairs appropriés, et quand les egos sont autorisés à devenir hors de contrôle. Il nous entraîne dans la nature de l’évolution, les bases de la méthodologie scientifique, comment les mathématiques se rapportent à la science, ce qui constitue une théorie, et même quelles attitudes à la religion et la générosité sont appropriées que nous approchons inexorablement l’effondrement de la civilisation industrielle. Ceux qui souhaitent un cadre complet à jour pour le comportement humain de la vue moderne de deux systemes peuvent consulter mon livre 'The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Ceux qui s’intéressent à plus de mes écrits peuvent voir «Talking Monkeys --Philosophie, Psychologie, Science, Religion et Politique sur une planète condamnée --Articles et revues 2006-2019 3e ed (2019) et Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2020) et autres. (shrink)

Matagal nang dinalumat ang konsepto ng Inang Bayan bilang kabuuang tunguhin ng kilusang panghimagsikan ng Kataastaasan, Kagalang-galangang Katipunan (KKK) ng mga Anak ng Bayan. Lehitimong gawain ito dahil bukod sa kontekstong nakaugat ang bayan sa ina/mater vis-à-vis patria, mahihinuha ring malaki ang pagkilala ng Supremong si Andres Bonifacio sa kadakilaan ng kababaihan sa panahon ng himagsikan. Sa kabila nito, masasabing may suliranin sa historiograpiyang Pilipino dahil isinasantabi ng ilang positibista at sexistang manunulat ang kolektibong gunita sa kababaihan bilang kasama ng (...) bayan. Kung kaya’t patuloy itong iwinawasto sa pagdaan ng panahon. Masusumpungan ito kung gagawing halimbawa ang kababaihan sa rebolusyong Pilipino. Naisasantabi sila bilang mga paksa ng pag-aaral o kung minsan, itinuturing na palamuti lamang na kailangang idugtong sa pangalan ng kalalakihan. Kaugnay ng suliraning ito kung kaya’t itinatampok sa pag-aaral na ito ang muling pagsipat sa apat na mahahalagang bagay: (1) kasaysayan ng kababaihang Pilipina noong dantaon 19; (2) pakikisangkot ng kababaihan sa Katipunan at himagsikan; (3) pagtingin ng Katipunan sa kababaihan; at (4) impluwensya ng Katipunan sa pagkilos ng kababaihan sa pagpasok ng dantaon 20. Mangyari pa, titingnan din ang muling pakikilahok ng kababaihan sa mga digmaang bayan sa panahon ng post-Katipunan. Hindi ito bagong pag-aaral kundi isang paglalagom sa mga naunang pag-aaral. Kakikitaan ang papel na ito ng mas matinding hamon at pagpursigi sa pagsusulat ng mga paksa na may kinalaman sa Araling Pangkababaihan at Araling Pangkasarian. Tunguhin ng papel ang holistikong kasaysayan ng kababaihan sa pakikisangkot nila sa Katipunan bilang mga kasama ng bayan. (shrink)

Aristóteles, em sua obra De anima, além de apresentar uma intrigante teoria sobre intelecto (nous), que dá margem a uma compreensão bipartida do mesmo em ativo (nous poiētikos) e passivo (nous pathetikon), afirma que as afecções do intelecto são distintas das afecções de quem o possui. Uma das afecções deste que possui o intelecto, segundo o filósofo, é o raciocínio. Ademais, diz que este é perecível, ao passo que aquele é impassível e eterno. Desta maneira, longe de aclarar, acaba por (...) dif icultar não somente o entendimento do conceito de intelecto, como também o entendimento do que viria a ser a atividade racional (dianóia). Dessarte, o presente trabalho visa esclarecer os conceitos de nous e dianóia no intuito de obtermos, numa perspectiva aristotélica, um maior entendimento do nosso processo de conhecimento em geral. (shrink)

Many believe that paternalism is less wrong in intimate relationships. In this paper, we argue that this view cannot be justified by appeal to (i) beneficence, (ii) shared projects, (iii) vulnerability, (iv) epistemic access, (v) expressivism, or (vi) autonomy as nonalienation. We finally provide an error theory for why many may have believed that paternalism is less wrong in intimate relations.

In this treatise, al-Fārābī refers to mental acquisition of certain elementary principles of knowledge or cognitions that are the primary basis of any demonstrative process; and this means that cognitions, which are in our intellect, are independent of all experience. The innate character of cognitions is treated in his other works, as is their nature, e.g., whether they are content-ideas or dispositio.

Bago matapos ang dantaon 19, umusbong ang mga kilusang mapagpalaya kontra kolonisador sa iba’t ibang kapuluan ng Pilipinas at Indonesia (mga bansang kabilang/kaugnay ng Dunia Melayu). Isa sa mga iginigiit na dahilan ng bawat bayan (negara ng Indonesia) ay ang malawakang reporma hinggil sa relihiyon/paniniwala – pagpapanatili, pagbabago, o di kaya’y pakikisangkot. Sapul pa noong panahong dati, patuloy nang pinahahalagahan ng bawat katutubong Malayo/Austronesyano ang kanilang paniniwala na malalim ang pagkaka-ugat sa kapangyarihan at impluwensiya ng kanilang kapaligiran at sabihin pa’y (...) pinamumunuan ito ng mga lider (i.e. babaylan para sa mga sinaunang Pilipino at pawang/dukun sa mga katutubong Indones). Sa pagpasok ng kolonisasyon ng sa mundo ng mga Melayu, nagkaroon ng malawakang pagkitil sa lipunan at mga katutubong paniniwala/tradisyon. Kung niyakap man nila ang ipinakilalang relihiyon ng mga dayuhan, nawalan naman sila ng pakikisangkot kung kaya’t nagbunsod ito sa pagbubuo ng mga kalat-kalat na kilusan. Sa kabila ng malalim na koneksyon ng mga katutubo sa kanilang lumang paniniwala, hindi nakapagtataka kung bakit katuwang nila ang kabuuang salik nito sa pagbubuo at adhikain ng mga kilusan. Ito ang direktang dahilan kung bakit sila binansagan ng mga Kanluranin bilang mga mesyaniko, kilyastiko, at panatiko. Itinatampok sa pag-aaral na ito ang komparatibong pag-aaral sa mga kilusang mapagpalaya na naka-ugat sa relihiyon noong kalagitnaan ng dantaon 19. Muling tatalakayin ang pagbubuo ng Cofradia de San Jose (1832) ni Hermano Puli ng Tayabas, Pilipinas laban sa mga prayleng Kastila. Pagkatapos nito’y ihahalintulad naman ang huli sa mga kilusang panrelihyon na nabuo sa ibayong dagat katulad ng Digmaang Minangkabau (1803-1837) ni Tuanku Imam Bonjol ng Kanlurang Sumatra, Indonesia laban sa mga kasangkot at sulsol na Holandes sa pagwasak ng katutubong paniniwala at panloob na relasyon. (shrink)

Dans un nombre croissant de domaines scientifiques - sciences de la nature, sciences humaines aussi bien que sciences des artefacts -, la simulation ne joue plus le rôle de succédané temporaire d'une théorie encore en gésine parce que non encore élaborée ; c'est-à-dire qu'elle ne joue plus systématiquement le rôle d'un modèle provisoire ou d'un schéma servant à condenser les mesures. C'est qu'elle n'a pas la nature d'un signe graphique, linguistique ou mathématique. Elle joue au contraire de plus en plus (...) le rôle d'une réplication détaillée du réel : elle est une intuition reconstruite avec justesse mais sans abstraction rationnelle et généralisante, donc sans transfiguration iconique. Une des limites de l'épistémologie dialectique de Bachelard tient à ce qu'elle ne donne pas les concepts pour penser assez distinctement ces pratiques contemporaines de simulation. C'est pourquoi l'A. propose de concevoir l'idée que la science contemporaine se développe non plus selon la seule dialectique matérialisme / rationalisme, mais selon la triade rationalisme/computationalisme/matérialisme. (shrink)

Sa pag-aaral ukol sa kasaysayang intelektuwal ng mga nasyunalistang diskurso sa akademya, kadalasang nagsisimula ang mga mananaliksik sa Dekada 70s, partikular sa tinaguriang mga kilusang pagsasakatutubo sa Unibersidad ng Pilipinas. Hindi gaanong napagtutuunan ng pansin sa mga publikasyon ang ugat ng mga nasyunalistang diskursong ito sa mga taon bago ang Dekada 1970s. Sa bagong akda ni Charlie Samuya Veric na Children of the Postcolony (COTP), tinangka niyang punan ang patlang na ito sa kasaysayang intelektuwal ng bansa, sa pamamagitan ng pagtuon (...) sa kaisipan nina Edith Tiempo, Fernando Zobel, Bienvenido Lumbera, E. San Juan Jr., at Jose Maria Sison. Ang sanaysay na ito ay isang deskriptibong pagbasa sa COTP ni Veric, na naglalayong siyasatin ang saysay ng akda sa ‘di pa tapos na proyekto ng kapantasang Pilipino na pumiglas mula sa akademikong imperyalismo ng Kanluran. (shrink)

Bilang “kathang-buhay” ni Zeus A. Salazar, ang tinaguriang Ama ng Pantayong Pananaw (PP) at ng Bagong Historiograpiyang Pilipino, hindi mauunawaan ang PP nang hiwalay sa kanyang akademikong talambuhay. Kaya naman mainam na baybayin angkasaysayan ng Pantayong Pananaw sa konteksto ng kapantasanni Salazar. Maaaring hatiin ang kasaysayan ng PP sa konteksto ng kapantasan ni Salazar sa limang yugto, gamit ang metapora ng paglago ng halaman: 1. Panahon ng Pagpupunla ng mga ideyang magiging batayang kaisipan ng PP sa hinaharap, mula sapagpasok ni (...) Salazar sa Unibersidad ng Pilipinas (PP) bilang magaaral ng kasaysayan (1951) hanggang sa pagkakalimbag ngkanyang Ang Pagtuturo ng Kasaysayan sa Pilipino (1970), maaari itong bansagan bilang “Yugtong Pre-Pantayo”; 2. Panahon ng Pag-uugat ng PP sa UP mula sa pagkakalimbag ng artikulo ukol sa wikang Filipino (1970) hanggang sa pagdaraos ng Unang Pambansang Kumperensya sa Historiograpiyang Pilipino, kaalinsabay ng paghirang sa kanya bilang dekano ng Dalubhasaan ng Agham Panlipunan at Pilosopiya at pagdaraos ng (1989), 3. Panahon ng Pagsibol ng PP sa UP na tumutukoy sa institusyunalisasyon nito sa UP Departamento ng Kasaysayanmula sa kumperensyang ito (1989) hanggang sa pagkakalimbag ng Pantayong Pananaw: Ugat at Kabuluhan (1997), 4. Panahon ng Pagyabong ng PP sa labas ng UP mula sa pagkakalimbag ng aklat (1997) hanggang sa paglulunsad ng Saliksik E-Journal (2012), at 5. Panahon ng Pamumunga mula sa paglulunsad ngSaliksik E-Journal (2012) hanggang sa pagtatapos ng pagtuturo ni Salazar sa Politeknikong Unibersidad ng Pilipinas (2019). (shrink)

I explore the critical significance of the phenomenological notion of intuition. I argue that there is no meaning that is originally formal-conceptual. The meanings of concepts function as symbolic approximations to original nonconceptual, intuitive givens. However, the meaning content originally intuitively given in lived experience has a tendency to be lost in pursuit of universalizability and communicability of conceptual content. Over time, conceptual approximations lose their reference to the experience that had given them their meaning in the first place. The (...) loss of an experiential reference makes for a vacuous set of concepts, giving way to ideologies, by which I mean the conscious prejudicial support for a set of ideas without the experiential, intuitive context that is necessary to see the value of those ideas. A critical phenomenology is a critique of ideological views by descriptively recovering the intuitive content whereby concepts can be adequately reevaluated. -/- This main aim of this work is to establish the methodological features of critical phenomenology by responding to the objections made against phenomenology and intuition by Frankfurt School critical theorists. Scheler’s phenomenology is used as a way forward due to his far-reaching critique of reason and emphasis on the phenomenological intuition of value. -/- Chapter 1 considers three Frankfurt School objections of Husserlian phenomenology, as (1) immanentist (Adorno), (2) idealist (Adorno), and (3) normatively empty (Habermas). Each fail to discern the subtle features of nonidentity with respect to Husserl’s notions of apperception and adumbrated phenomena. -/- Chapter 2 shows how Scheler’s original view of the phenomenological attitude makes more explicit Husserl’s subtle dialectical elements. Adequate and inadequate givenness is interpreted with respect to one’s intentional orientation and the moral attitudes carried within the world, influencing the content of the given. -/- Chapter 3 confronts the popular charge of idealism. Reality is a problem for phenomenology only to conscious modes of givenness. But through ecstatic modes of givenness (in resistances) Scheler’s phenomenology achieves an existential ground that is crucial for phenomenology to engage actually existing social structures and factors. -/- Chapter 4 concerns the charge that phenomenology is normatively empty. That Scheler had developed a theory of value is not enough to rebut the charge but his view of value-givenness as an attitude informed by the act of loving, opens an awareness of the values disclosed by that attitude. -/- Chapter 5 shows that Scheler’s sociology of knowledge, in contrast to Karl Mannheim’s interpretation, provides a unified picture of the interdependency of spirit and life needed for the realization of values in the world and society. -/- Chapter 6 suggests a way of framing a phenomenological critique of ideology. Scheler points to the attitudinal factors of loving and hating to disclose systemic devaluation and overvaluation. This awareness arises (1) from noticing how individual valuation reflects social valuation, and (2) by being attuned to how one’s own intuitions contradict prevailing social valuation and thought, thereby opening a space for a critique of those patterns. (shrink)

Because factory-farmed meat production inflicts gratuitous suffering upon animals and wreaks havoc on the environment, there are morally compelling reasons to become vegetarian. Yet industrial plant agriculture causes the death of many field animals, and this leads some to question whether consumers ought to get some of their protein from certain kinds of non factory-farmed meat. Donald Bruckner, for instance, boldly argues that the harm principle implies an obligation to collect and consume roadkill and that strict vegetarianism is thus immoral. (...) But this argument works only if the following claims are true: all humans have access to roadkill, roadkill would go to waste if those who happen upon it don’t themselves consume it, it’s impossible to harvest vegetables without killing animals, the animals who are killed in plant production are all-things-considered harmed by crop farming, and the best arguments for vegetarianism all endorse the harm principle. As I will argue in this paper, each claim is deeply problematic. Consequently, in most cases, humans ought to strictly eat plants and save the roadkill for cats. (shrink)

Layunin ng komemoratibong pag-aaral na ito, gamit ang isang naratibong pagsusuri, ang pagturol sa danas at alaala ng mga Marikeño sa panahon ng pananalasa at/o pagbahang idinulot ng Ondoy (Ketsana) noong 2009 at sa mga panahong pagkatapos nito. Habang sentro ng pag-aaral na ito ang apat na barangay ng lungsod o ang mga tinatawag na “tabing-ilog”—Nangka, Tumana, Malanday, at Concepcion Uno—gumamit ang pananaliksik ng dalawang pangunahing método, pakikipagpanayam at pakikipagkuwentuhan. Sa kinasapitan, nakapagluwal ang pananaliksik na ito ng dalawang pangunahing bahagi: (...) una, mga naratibo ng danas at alaala sa panahon ng pananalasa ng Ondoy at ikalawa, pagsisiyasat sa mga sumunod na panahon. Sa kabuoan, nakapaglatag ang pag-aaral na ito ng pitong dalumat ukol sa kahulugan, kabuluhan, at konteksto ng Ondoy sa pananaw ng mga Marikeño: (1) delubyo, (2) kaparusahan, (3) kaligtasan, (4) pagtulong, (5) palatandaan, (6) takot, at (7) kasanayan. Hatid ng pag-aaral na ito ang isang implikasyong magpapahalaga sa dalawang bagay—(1) Araling at Kasaysayang Pangkapaligiran o isang subdisiplinang kakanlong sa pag-aaral ng kasaklawan ng kalikasan at kapaligirang Pilipino at (2) Kasaysayang Pampook o pagsasalaysay ng kasaysayan ukol sa isang partikular na pook. Samakatwid, ang kabuoang implikasyon ay magbibigay-linaw at ambag sa saysay ng Ondoy bílang bahagi ng kalikasan at kapaligirang Marikeño sa unang banda at ang saysay ng Marikina bílang pook sa kabilang banda. (shrink)

This chapter introduces and defends a pragmatist model of aesthetic disagreement that avoids many of the philosophical puzzles generated by the traditional, semantic, approach. Mainstream philosophical inquiry into aesthetic disagreement begins with a rather innocuous assumption: to understand what’s going on we must first explain what disputants are saying, which involves identifying the meaning of the relevant expressions or determining how aesthetic claims could be true. However, this task brings with it a new host of semantic and epistemic puzzles and (...) fails to vindicate the central role aesthetic disagreements occupy in our aesthetic lives more generally. Further, it isn’t clear how settling the meaning of aesthetic expressions bears on everyday aesthetic disagreements. Paying attention to what we do in an aesthetic disagreement will give us a better chance at identifying what matters for determining what we say. (shrink)

O artigo tem por objetivo mostrar que, ao contrário do que muitos parecem ainda acreditar, a filosofia aristotélica reconhece a possibilidade de um conflito prático genuíno entre a busca do bem individual e a busca do bem da comunidade política por parte de um mesmo indivíduo. As conclusões alcançadas são puramente negativas. Este artigo terá cumprido o seu objetivo se contribuir para despertar no leitor o reconhecimento do problema e da necessidade de investigações ulteriores.

The aim of this paper is to put into perspective Marcien Towa's reception of the Hegelian notion of the abstract mind in his book Identité et Transcendance. In an attempt to determine the generic identity of man, Towa exploits the notion of the abstract mind as pure thought to expose the complex notion of African identity articulated in transcendence. In contrast to the essentialist, even ontological theses of Senghor and Blyden, which turn identities into essences, Towa develops from the conceptual (...) resources of German idealism a conception of identity that is radically transcendent, i.e. creativity. (shrink)

Tout le film est toujours une microphysique du pouvoir, en potence, d’être étudier. Aujourd’hui l'augmentation des productions d'horreur et son public ont fait le film d'horreur une «contreculture» dominante, mais toujours sous l'effet négatif du pouvoir et du savoir qui disqualifient les discours, matérialisée dans ces films, ce qui les rend illégitime et exiler en soi espace filmique, transformée en un lieu adapté pour interdite et marquée par certaines pratiques discursives avec certains dispositifs d'exclusion. Paradoxalement, les types marginaux qui apparaissent (...) dans l'ordre de ces productions occupent les positions de sujets à exercer le pouvoir dans l'horreur et dans le même temps le renforcement de leur marginalité et de son objectivation. Ces aspects et les spécificités qui caractérisent les productions d'une part, nous ont amenés à identifier les pratiques de l'objectivation qui transforment corps dans les sujets dans l'horreur; d'autre part, de démontrer que ces films constituent une nouvelle technologie de contrôle social des corps, mais l'objectif principal de cette étude est d'analyser les relations de pouvoir à travers l'antagonisme des stratégies dans ce discours, qui est, pour savoir ce que cela signifie d'avoir un corps libre, nous examinons ce qui se passe sur le corps subjugué dans les films d'horreur, prenant l'archeogenealogie de Foucault comme base théorique. Cette questionhypothèse aurait un autre groupe: d'où pourrait faire une telle histoire? Nous supposons que dans les moments de crise, les films d'horreur ont beaucoup à prouver, donc nous avons opté pour un très similaire à celui qui Foucault a été invité par les experts de la revue Cahiers du cinéma pour discuter des conditions pour les productions cinématographiques comme Le Chagrin et la Pitié (1969), Portier de nuit (1974) et Lacombe Lucien (1974), quand on a regardé le déclin du gaullisme et l’ascention de Valéry Giscard d'Estaing , le vainqueur de la présidentielle de 1974, avec le soutien de l'ancien droit Tardieu et petainistes, anciens alliés de l'occupation du Führer Hitler de la France, entre 1940 à 1943. Maintenant, les conditions de production sont ceux qui marquent la fin des gouvernements socialistes de Mitterrand et Chirac, et le retour au pouvoir de la droite, à l'ascension politique de Nicolas Sarkozy. Au milieu de la crise économique de l'Union Européenne, flotte dans l'air la peur terrifiante de risque que l'arrivée de l'extrême droite au pouvoir. La présence croissante d'immigrants est aussi dans l'ordre d'une nouvelle crise de l'identité française. Ce sont les conditions de production de À l'intérieur, Frontière (s),Martyrs, Ils, La Meute, Captifs et Derrière les murs et, des films qui font partie de notre corpus. À la methodologie, nous développons les trois concepts opérationnels: le dispositif filmique de la mémoire, de la vérité et de l'objectivité pour traiter la mémoire populaire, recodé dans ces films et soi-disant perçu par nous comme l'un des principaux modes de contrôle des corps d’horreur; la notion d’intericonicité est encore utilisée pour indiquer des images qui renvoient à d'autres, mais tout en réalisant que chaque image a dans sa juxtaposition afin de utopies des hétérotopies. Donc, nous avons décidé de donner une nouvelle forme à cette notion, y compris l'utopique juxtaposés à des espaces hétérotopiques, sous l'influence de la discussion faite par Foucault dans le Corps utopique et Les hétérotopies. Keyword:Mémoire. Corps. Pouvoir. Discours politique. Film français d’horreur. (shrink)

This article aims to understand the views of three prominent figures in existential literature and philosophy: Albert Camus, Søren Kierkegaard, and Fyodor Dostoevsky. The analysis focuses on exploring and explaining fundamental concepts of their philosophies, such as morality, the meaning of life, and the relationship with the divine, in order to establish a dialogue among these three authors. The underlying thread connecting these thinkers is the Socratic figure of speech, irony. Through the examination of contradictions and ironic elements present in (...) their works, the article highlights the significance of irony as a central core in their ideas, encompassing both academic discourse and the realms of literature and symbolism. The comparative method employed goes beyond contrasts, also emphasizing points of contact between the ideas expressed through the stages of existence and the personalities of the protagonists in their novels. The initial sections for each author introduce the basic concepts for general understanding. Subsequently, the main ideas are explored through analysis of their masterpieces, leading to a comparative dialogue among them. Contrasts involve the perspectives embodied by characters like Alyosha Karamazov, Meursault, and Zosima, showcasing the authors' opinions, reflecting the zeitgeist, and highlighting their divergences, ultimately providing a comprehensive view of how they influenced and criticized each other within the philosophical tradition. (shrink)

Tyler Burge (2010) provided a scathing critique of all programs for naturalizing concepts of representation, especially teleological naturalizing programs. He tended to demonstrate that “representational content” is a concept that cannot be reduced to more fundamental biological or physical ideas. According to him, since the 1970s, the concept of representational content has been firmly established in cognitive psychology as a mature science and utilized inadequate explanations. Since Dretske’s program is Burge’s primary objective, this paper concentrates on Dretske’s perspective. Following Burge’s (...) criticisms, I concur that Dretske’s naturalizing program trivializes the complex concept of representational content in cognitive science by applying it to bacteria, protozoa, etc. There is a superior explanation, namely Burge’s alternative idea of “registering information.” I do not believe, however, that this spells the end of naturalization programs. There is no reason to deny that at least some biological functions entail representational capacities with perceptual constancy, if not all. Cases of genuine perception, representing the accurate distal causes of proximal stimuli under various conditions, contribute to fitness. It is not by accident that representational content plays a role in cases of genuine perception. Consequently, I will argue that accuracy and biological fitness cannot be separated. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to critically review several interpretations of Kantian sensible intuition. The first interpretation is the recent construal of Kantian sensible intuition as a mental analogue of a direct referential term. The second is the old, widespread assumption that Kantian intuitions do not refer to mind-independent entities, such as bodies and their physical properties, unless they are brought under categories. The third is the assumption that, by referring to mind-independent entities, sensible intuitions represent objectively in the (...) sense that they represent in a relative, perspective-independent manner. The fourth is the construal of Kantian sensible intuitions as non-conceptual content. In this paper, I support the alternative view that Kantian sensible representation is to be seen as iconic de re presentation of objects without representational content. (shrink)

In recent discussions, it has been argued that a theory of animal rights is at odds with a liberal abortion policy. In response, Francione (1995) argues that the principles used in the animal rights discourse do not have implications for the abortion debate. I challenge Francione’s conclusion by illustrating that his own framework of animal rights, supplemented by a relational account of moral obligation, can address the moral issue of abortion. I first demonstrate that Francione’s animal rights position, which grounds (...) moral consideration in sentience, is committed to the claim that a sentient fetus has a right to life. I then illustrate that a fully developed account of animal rights that recognizes the special obligations humans have to assist animals when we cause them to be dependent and vulnerable through our voluntary actions or omissions is committed to the following: a woman also has a special obligation to assist a sentient fetus when she causes it to be dependent and vulnerable through her voluntary actions or omissions. From these considerations, it will become evident that a fully developed and consistent animal rights ethic does in fact have implications for the abortion discussion. (shrink)